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When a buyer is uncertain whether a good/service design can fulfill the need of the purchase,
the buyer is unable to write a complete contract, which may lead to a costly modification ex-post.
In this paper, I study how the buyer’s uncertainty affects the seller-selection process and contract
price. The buyer tries to maximize his/her expected payoff by choosing a selection process and
subsequently negotiating a price that accounts for the hold-up cost and the cost of modification.
I gather a sample of federal service procurement contracts solicited through either a competitive
or a non-competitive process with potential modifications observed ex-post. Empirically, to solve
the endogenous selection issue, I adapt the Extended Roy Model with a predicted likelihood of
modification. I find that, with less uncertainty or more market competition, it is more likely that
the service will be procured through a competitive process. Moreover, ceteris paribus, when the
uncertainty goes up, contract prices drop more in services procured through the non-competitive
process than those procured through the competitive process.
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CHAPTER 1
UNCERTAINTY AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS IN PROCUREMENTS
1.1 Introduction
When two parties enter into an agreement, either formally (like a contract) or informally
(like a promise), there is always a chance that the initial agreement may be breached or fail
to be fulfilled completely. Then, the two parties need to either terminate or renegotiate for an
amended agreement. In general, both parties will try to avoid such scenarios happening, since
either termination or renegotiation is costly. However, parties may be unable to specify some
outcomes at the time of the agreement to completely avoid incurring those costs. The buyer and
seller in turn factor such uncertainties into their initial agreement. If there is a price involved in the
agreement, it will reflect this uncertainty.
Procurement is a type of purchasing agreement between a buyer and a seller. The most commonly
seen ones are government procurements, in which taxpayers’ money is used to provide public
goods and services. Every fiscal year, government entities in the U.S. spend a significant portion of
their budgets to acquire goods and services, either specially customized or commercially available,
from private firms to fulfill the needs of performing governmental services. In the fiscal year of
2016, at the federal level, the total value of procurements was about $472 billion (USASPENDING.gov).
Of that, about $303 billion was spent by the Department of Defense (DOD). Goods and services
procured by the DOD range from daily supplies to highly sophisticated weapon systems.
Although auction is the default option set by the U.S. Congress, procuring officers tend to use less
public and less competitive processes in procurements more frequently than common perceptions
(referring to Table 1.1 for spending distribution of processes). Motivated by such a phenomenon,
in this paper, I investigate how uncertainty affects the procuring officer’s choice between procuring
processes and contract prices. Therefore, I focus on a non-competitive procuring process, “Only
One Source” (referred to as sole source in the discussion below), and a competitive process,
“Negotiated Proposal/Quote” (referred to as negotiated proposal in the discussion below). Both
procuring processes use negotiating as the means of determining the contract price between the
procuring officer and each participating firm. Nevertheless, in the sole source process, the procuring
officer will only negotiate with one firm, while in the negotiated proposal process, the procuring
officer will negotiate with multiple firms simultaneously. Furthermore, in both cases, if the initial
contract did not deliver what the procuring officer intended to have, s/he will renegotiate with
the contract-receiving firm to make necessary changes to fulfill the need. For a renegotiation, the
procuring officer is restricted to only negotiate with the incumbent firm. If the procuring officer
wants to look for an alternative source, a new procurement needs to get started.
I develop a model based on Tirole (2009) to specify how a procuring officer chooses between the
sole source process and the negotiated proposal process, and then how the procuring officer and the
firm(s) negotiate the contract price conditioning on the process selected. Specifically, the choice
of process will be determined by anticipated prices along with the level of competitiveness in a
specific market. After selecting the procuring process, the procuring officer will negotiate with the
firm(s) selected for a price, which is determined by bilateral Nash bargaining in the sole source and
Bertrand competition in the negotiated proposal. However, when they negotiate for the contract
price, they must consider the probability that a modification is needed in the future. In either
procuring process, a renegotiation for modification is modeled as a bilateral Nash Bargaining,
which in turn makes the procuring officer not only have to pay for the cost of modification, but
also transfer a proportion of the recovered gain to the firm (based on the firm’s bargaining power).
From USASPENDING.gov, I collect data of DOD contracts that are procured through either the
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sole source process or the negotiated proposal process from the fiscal year 2005 to 2016.1 I select
procurements that are services under the category of ”Special Study or Research (non-R&D)”.
Each procurement contains characteristics of the procurement (contract length, location, number
of modification, type, etc.), characteristics of the contract-receiving firm (firm size, number of
employees, address, enrolled special programs), and contract agency information. Additionally,
the dataset also includes any modification (could be none, once, or more than once) that happened
after the signing of the initial procurement contract. Each modification contains the same set of
information as the initial contract.
To obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters governing the procuring officer’s choice, I would
need to observe two prices for each procurement: the price generated through the sole source
process and the price generated through the negotiated proposal process. However, in the dataset,
I only observe the price for which the process is used, so I employ the Extended Roy Model
to resolve this issue. First, I predict the procuring officer’s expectation of the likelihood that a
modification happens in the future. Then, combining the predicted likelihood estimated in the first
step along with characteristics of the price and the level of competition, I apply a Probit model to
estimate the procuring officer’s choice between the two procuring processes. Third, I estimate the
impact of uncertainty on contract prices, controlling for the selection issue.
There are a few takeaways from estimation results. On the one hand, the theoretical model predicts
the procuring officer is more likely to choose the negotiated proposal process when there are
less uncertainty and more competition, which are strongly supported by the estimation results.
Intuitively, if a modification is less likely to happen, the procuring officer benefits more from
paying less in a competitive process (negotiated proposal). Also, more competition makes a
competitive process more feasible. However, the prediction that the negotiated proposal is used
more often when the cost is lower is weakly supported by the results. In a procurement with a low
1USASPENDING.gov compiles individual entries of procurement contracts from the Federal Procurement Data
System (FPDS) into a comprehensive dataset that can be filtered by different criteria.
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cost, the procuring officer faces less hold-up cost. On the other hand, for procurement contract
prices, evidence shows that, with a higher cost, the contract price goes up. And the results weakly
support the prediction that a higher uncertainty drops the contract price. It is also ambiguous
whether the price in the sole source process falls more than it in the negotiated proposal when the
uncertainty increases the same amount.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to theories of the incomplete contract. As summarized by Tirole (1999),
incomplete contract models are built upon the existence of transaction cost of unforeseeable states
of nature, cost of writing contracts, or cost of enforcing contracts. Subsequently, he uses a two-
stage model to show that even if not all states are foreseeable, parties’ information on payoffs is not
affected when the contract is written. After Hart and Moore (1988) model an incomplete contract
as the result of unspecified/unforeseeable states in contracts, Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue that
the classical framework in the incomplete contract is lack of a mathematical framework to make a
renegotiation necessary. They think that, as long as payoffs of states can be specified in a contract,
the renegotiation is irrelevant to writing an optimal contract. In response, Hart and Moore (1999)
establish a rigorous model to present that, unless parties are able to make binding commitments
on not renegotiating, an optimal contract can be written as an incomplete one with an option of
ex-post renegotiation. Segal (1999) introduces the factor of the complexity of a contract into the
incomplete contract model. His work shows that each one of the transaction costs mentioned in
Tirole (1999) can be used to explain the contract incompleteness. Battigalli and Maggi (2002), on
the other hand, focus on writing costs resulting from either a contract that is not specific enough or
an obligation that is not changed by any circumstance. My paper follows the thoughts in this strand
of literature that what is an incomplete contract, why an unforeseeable state causes an incomplete
contract, and how the renegotiation fits into such structure.
For empirical work, this paper first ties to studies comparing different procuring processes. Cameron
(2000) compiles a dataset consisting of long-term power contracts measured by the technical
complexity and fairness. This paper concludes that a selecting process which gives the buyer more
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discretion increases the probability of contract breach and reduces the price moderately. Bajari,
McMillan, and Tadelis (2008) empirically analyze auction versus negotiation in procurements of
construction works in Northern California. They find that the frequency of using the negotiation
process increases when the procurement is more complex. Additionally, the level of competitiveness
is not affected by the value of the procurement. Firms with higher reputations and more qualifications
are preferred in both processes, especially the negotiation. Levin and Tadelis (2010) model a
procuring officer’s make-or-buy decision (keeping in-house operations vs. outsourcing to third
parties) to answer why and when the procuring officer decides to privatize a public service, with
the fact that outsourcing incurs transaction costs but reduces administrative costs. Using U.S.
municipal service contracts, their results suggest that services with high transaction costs and
high-level quality concerns are less likely to be outsourced. Coviello and Guglielmo (2015) run a
discontinuity design on Italian public-work contracts to test how an increase in buyer’s discretion
affects the procurement outcome. They find that, in auctions with more restrictions, the same
firm wins over and over. Kang and Miller (2017) also establish a model to explore a buyer’s
discretion over the extent of competition and the format of contract pricing. After developing
a structural estimation model and testing it with federal procurements data, they conclude that
using a competitive negotiation lowers the competition level compared to a competitive first-price
auction. Even though the discretion held by a buyer may induce rent-seeking behaviors, it may
still reduce procurement costs because of the buyer’s knowledge of the supply-side of goods or
services. Relatively, in this paper, the buyer’s discretion reflects on his/her capability to choose the
procuring process.
Second, this paper is also closely related to work on renegotiations in procurements. Guasch,
Laffont, and Straub (2008) look for determinants of renegotiations from procurement contracts
of concession rights in Latin America. They find that more regulation and better institutional
quality significantly reduce the probability of a renegotiation. Decarolis (2014) studies the trade-
off between the cost saved from the first-price auction and the cost incurred by the renegotiation
(due to poor performance). Exploring data generated by a policy experiment of Italian public
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administrations, he uses a difference-in-difference method to show that the first-price auction
lowers procurement costs but worsens the performance (measured by incurring additional costs
or delays in completion). Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) present a model that procurement
contracts are kept incomplete due to uncertainties of procurements and/or unforeseeable states.
They use U.S. highway paving procurement auctions to discover that firms strategically factor in
transaction costs into their bids. Gagnepain, Ivaldi, and Martimort (2013) analyze procurement
contracts of French public transportation services to assess how transaction costs associated with
renegotiations change welfare and how those gains are distributed among parties. Using the policy
which each public transportation service in France needs to be re-signed every five years, they
find that extending contract duration to more than five years will increase welfare gains, especially
for firms’ surpluses. Their structural estimation also suggests that the firm’s bargaining power
in renegotiations largely depends on local authorities’ political preferences (right-wing vs. left-
wing). Ryan (2019) studies how renegotiations in Indian long-term power contracts endogenously
affect firms’ bidding strategies. Results indicate that, while the exogenous shocks on coal prices
are the main driving factor for renegotiations, politically connected firms deliberately ignore such
risk and lower their bids in auctions since they can recover those losses in renegotiations. With the
same source of data from USASPENDING.gov, Warren (2014) estimates the effect of the buyer’s
workload on his/her choice of contract completeness. Reduced-form results indicate that, with a
higher workload, the buyer tends to write a less complete contract and chooses a less competitive
procuring process. Most previous literature has been comparing auction vs. negotiation. And in
this paper, I focus on comparing two negotiating processes taking different price schemes.
1.3 Institutional Details
The Federal Procurement Data System records every federal procurement contract plus every
associated modification. Each of the observations includes information on 1) the procurement,
2) the firm that receives the contract, and 3) the agency which gives out the contract (for details,
please refer to the data section of this paper). Figure 1.1 below shows the weekly spending, pooled
from the fiscal year 2005 to 2016, of all contracts (including modifications) and all new contracts.
I can see that the spending by week is pretty smooth through the first 50 weeks but show a spike
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Figure 1.1: Pooled Weekly Spending (fiscal Year 2005-2016)
towards the end of the fiscal year. As Liebman and Mahoney (2017) studied, federal agencies
have the incentive to use up all their budgets before the end of the fiscal year since any unspent
budget will go back to the treasury and they may also face budget cuts for the next year. However,
for most of the year, I can still conclude that agencies have a tight control on their spending to
avoid overspending because that may cause even more severe issues, such as questioning from
their superiors and inquiries from the Congress.
1.3.1 How Does Procuring by Negotiation Work?
Although a sealed-bid public auction is often viewed as the standard process used in government
procurement, in reality, variations of the negotiation process are the most frequent used ones. Based
on FAR Subpart 15, in different scenarios, the procuring officer will negotiate with only one firm
or multiple firms simultaneously. For the purpose of achieving the optimal result and receiving the
best value, the procuring officer is encouraged to continually exchange information with potential
participating firms and end-users regularly, even if there is no active contract between the procuring
officer and the firm. That creates a conduit of information from both directions to help firms
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understand potential procurements’ purposes and decide whether they can participate. Procuring
officers are also aware of existing market conditions.
In addition, a procuring officer can also issue a “Presolicitation Notice” to provide a general
scope or purpose of procurement to receive feedback from firms. The procuring officer can then
advise firms on whether they have a fair chance of winning that procurement. Those mechanisms
suggest that, even though certain behaviors are strictly prohibited (such as collusion and bribery),
appropriate communications are not uncommon. Both procuring officers and firms have incentives
to share some information with the other side. The procuring officer also has some access to the
cost data from the firm as part of the evaluation. Industry-level data is another aspect that the
procuring office needs to keep tracking.
Competitive Negotiated Proposal Process: If a negotiated proposal procuring process is used, the
procuring officer will first issue a Request for Proposals (RFPs), which includes a description
of requirements, terms, and conditions anticipated for the to-be-procured good or service to the
public. Any interested firms can submit their proposals based on the issued RFPs. Subsequently,
the procuring officer negotiates with each firm and selects the contract-receiving firm by making
evaluations on cost/price, past performance, and technicality. In order to determine a fair and
reasonable price, the procuring officer could acquire certified cost or pricing data.
Non-competitive Sole Source Process: In a sole source process, the procuring officer chooses and
negotiates with only one firm. According to Dilger (2018), although the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA) requires procuring officers to use a competitive procuring process to acquire goods
or services fully and openly, using a sole source procuring process is permissible with certain
justifications.2 For a sole source procurement, the total anticipated dollar amount of the contract
(including options) cannot exceed $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing procurements).3 Any
2There are seven justifications: 1) Only one firm can fulfill the need of the procuring officer; 2) Unusual and
compelling urgency; 3) Unique capability or expert services; 4) International agreement; 5) Authorized or required by
statute; 6) National security; 7) Public interest.
3An option is the right that the procuring officer can choose to purchase additional goods/services under certain
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procurement exceeding that threshold may be procured by the sole source process only if the
procuring officer does not expect to have at least two eligible firms participating in a competition.
Other Procuring Processes: As mentioned in the introduction section, there are eight procuring
processes commonly used in federal procurements. Besides the two I am discussing in this paper,
here is a summary for the rest of them: 1) Alternative Sources (AS): used when a procuring officer
looks for an either replacement or supplement firm for the firm which currently performs the
contract. 2) Architect Engineer and Basic Research (AE&BR): designated for specific categories
of professional services. 3) Subject to Multiple Award Fair Opportunity (MAFO): a procuring
officer can select more than one firm to split a procurement contract. 4) Sealed Bid (SB): the
conventional reverse first-price sealed-bid auction. 5) Simple Acquisition Procuring Process (SP1):
developed to reduce processing time and the amount of paperwork, but it is only applicable to a
procurement whose dollar amount is under a certain threshold. 6) Two Step (TS): a pre-selection
of participating firms followed by a sealed-bid auction. Generally, procuring processes adapted by
federal procuring officers are some variations from either auction or negotiation. Some procuring
processes are specifically designated to certain types of procurements, such as Architect Engineer
and Basic Research. And some processes reflect the government’s ongoing effort on reducing
procuring costs, such as Alternative Source and Multiple Award Fair Opportunity. Table 1.1
shows the distribution of total spending by different processes from 2005-2016. The combining
proportion of the Sole Source and Negotiated Proposal ranges from 60% to 90% throughout the
years. On the other hand, the Sealed Bid only takes a few percent of the total spending. This table
shows that the negotiated proposal and sole source are the procuring processes used the most often
by DOD, which makes the study of this paper more representative.
conditions (time, performance, etc).
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Table 1.1: Distribution of Spending
Year ASa AE&BR&TSb MAFOc SBd SP1e NPg SSh
2005 0.04% 2.24% 2.84% 4.06% 4.61% 46.97% 39.23%
2006 0.06% 2.07% 4.99% 2.94% 3.41% 45.58% 40.95%
2007 0.11% 2.34% 10.38% 1.80% 0.51% 44.36% 40.50%
2008 0.10% 2.47% 10.89% 1.96% 0.27% 44.93% 39.38%
2009 0.13% 2.85% 14.15% 1.85% 0.20% 39.86% 40.97%
2010 0.17% 2.38% 17.38% 1.61% 0.92% 39.73% 37.80%
2011 0.12% 1.98% 17.77% 1.37% 1.64% 37.75% 39.37%
2012 0.14% 2.00% 16.47% 1.06% 1.83% 37.87% 40.63%
2013 0.42% 1.82% 16.19% 1.10% 2.91% 36.35% 41.21%
2014 0.13% 2.09% 16.33% 1.36% 3.73% 37.65% 38.71%
2015 0.12% 2.01% 15.48% 1.16% 4.24% 35.64% 41.35%
2016 0.11% 2.05% 17.02% 1.30% 4.43% 35.86% 48.30%
a AS: Alternative Sources
b AE&BR&TS: Architect Engineer, Basic Research, and Two Step
c MAFO: Subject to Multiple Award Fair Opportunity
d SB: Sealed Bid
e SP1: Simple Acquisition Procuring Process
f NP: Negotiated Proposal
h SS: Sole Source
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Total 9,127,171 491,863 2,331,642 280,615
Subtotalb 8,012,507 363,064 1,778,597 249,663
8(a) SBAc 17 7 166,755 54,436
Non set-aside 8,012,490 363,057 1,611,842 195,227
a Number of contracts whose values are beyond the simplified acquisition
threshold.
b I only include contracts that procured through the negotiated competitive
process fully and openly, and contracts that procured via the sole source
process with only one firm participating.
c Small Business Administration 8(a) Program, which includes both the
competitive process and the sole source process
Table 1.2 shows the breakdown of contracts that are procured through either the negotiated
proposal process or the sole source process. I can see that majority of procurements whose contract
prices are under the simplified acquisition threshold, which means that those contracts are also
subject to the use Simplified Acquisition Process (SP1). For the purpose of simplifying steps and
reducing unnecessary paperwork, the FAR establishes the SP1 as an option for the procuring to
choose whenever the contract value is under a threshold. And the threshold is set to change every
five years. From fiscal year 2005-2009, the threshold is $100,000. In 2010, the threshold was
adjusted to $150,000, and it was further increased to $250,000 in 2016. However, for a large
number of procurements qualifying for the SP1, the procuring officer still chooses to use processes
other than the Simplified Acquisition Process. Therefore, to focus on the choice between two
processes, I exclude those observations whose contract prices are under the simplified acquisition
threshold in the sample used in this paper.
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1.3.2 What is a Modification?
Based on FAR Subpart 43, any written change in terms of a procurement contract is considered
as a modification. There are two types of modifications: 1) Bilateral modification that is signed by
both the procuring officer and the contract-receiving firm, which is generally used for adjusting/adding
contracting terms, and definitizing letter contracts; 2) Unilateral modification that is only signed by
the procuring officer, which is for making administrative changes, and issuing change orders and
termination notices.4 From a different perspective, if modifications are divided by their purposes,
there are: 1) Administrative changes (unilateral), 2) Other agreements (bilateral): negotiate for
changes outside of the initial contract, and 3) Change orders (unilateral): negotiate for changes
allowed in terms of the initial contract.5
When the procuring officer and the firm first sign the initial procurement contract, they will agree
that if a modification is needed in the future, which party is obligated to make the modification,
and which party pays for such changes. Thus, conditioning on the procuring process, both parties
will factor the potential modifications into their negotiation of the initial contract price.
Table D.1 in Appendix D shows the distribution of the total number of modifications in different
types from the fiscal year 2005 to 2016. The majority of modifications are concentrated on
Supplement Agreement, Funding only Actions, Change Order, and Other Administrative Actions.
There is a clear trend that the proportion of Other Administrative Action keeps increasing over
the years while the share of Funding Only Action is decreasing. The percentage of Supplement
Agreement has been up and down.
4An administrative change is a change in a procurement contract that has no substantial effect on both parties’
rights
5The procuring officer provides specifications and delivering instructions for the modification, and the firm is
obligated to perform. If any monetary change is involved, the procuring officer needs to pay that.
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1.3.3 Types of Goods or Services
Data from USASPENDING.gov contains a broad spectrum of procured goods and services,
from daily supplies to complex weapon systems. For complex goods/services, there is usually an
R&D phase involved, which I do not model in the theory section. For daily supplies, quantity is a
crucial variable determining the contract price. However, a significant shortcoming of this dataset
is that it does not include a complete record of quantities (if it is countable). To accommodate
those data issues, I choose to use service contracts, in which the cost of a service can be better
proxied by the contract length. To avoid that the quantity is the major determinant of the price, I
use service contracts that are not solicited repeatedly and closely related.
1.3.4 An Example
Table 1.3: Basic Information of An Exemplary Procurement
ITEM INFO
Dollars Obligated $167,835.56
Signing Date July 1, 2013
Completion Date January 8, 2015
Performance Location Crane, IN
Claimant Program Code S1
Product or Service Code Environmental Assessments
NAICS Code 541620 a
Contracting Office Naval FAC Engineering CMD Midwest
Contracting Agency Department of the Navy
Funding Office Naval FAC Engineering CMD Midwest
Funding Agency Department of the Navy
Number of Offers Received 6
Publicized or Not No
a Environmental Consulting Service
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In order to select contracts that fit my need, I use two characteristics in the dataset: the Claimant
Program Code and the Product or Service Code. The Claimant Program Code (used by DoD) helps
to identify contracts whose purposes are to procure services. The Product or Service Code (PSC)
is used to classify the type of services.6 In this paper, I use service contracts under Category B,
standing for ”Special Studies/Analysis (non R&D)”. There are also subcategories in Category B
to indicate the nature of the service. Table 1.3 gives a quick look at some essential information of
a service contract that is deemed to oversee ”interim measures necessary due to lead impacts to
ecological receptors”. Combining the Claimant Program Code and Product or Service Code, I am
able to know this contract is classified as an Environmental Assessments service procurement. The
NAICS code, an industry identifier, is telling the other side of the story. Both Claimant Program
Code and PSC are used only by federal agencies, but NAICS is assigned to each firm to define its
area of business operations. Therefore, the procuring officer will also match his/her procurement
need with a NAICS code to search for a firm that can perform the service.





1 $79,640.45 Supplement Agreement Extend sampling area
2 $17,111.21 Supplement Agreement
Two additional weeks of
interim measures oversight
3 - Other Admin. Change Extension of completion period
4 - Other Admin. Change Extension of completion period
6If a procurement involves more than one good or service, the procuring officer chooses the PSC based on the
predominant good or service by the dollar amount.
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Table 1.4 shows follow-up modifications of this procurement contract. The first two are bilateral
modifications, where monetary value is involved. The rest two are unilateral modifications that are
executed by the procuring officer only. In this paper, I only take factor in the bilateral modifications
since both parties need to approve such actions.
1.4 Theoretical Model
Based on Tirole (2009), uncertainty is the possibility that the initial design fails to fulfill
the need of a procurement. If that indeed happens, the procuring officer and the firm need to
renegotiate for a costly modification. And the modification is always modeled as bilateral Nash
bargaining. Two procuring processes, sole source and negotiated proposal, are compared in this
section. First, the sole source procuring process is modeled as bilateral Nash bargaining, in which
the procuring officer and the firm negotiate on the price of procurement and share the surplus based
on each party’s bargaining power. Second, the negotiated proposal procuring process is modeled
as Bertrand competition.7 Any follow-up renegotiation in both processes still adapts the bilateral
Nash bargaining structure.
1.4.1 Basic Setup
A timeline of the game is shown below. In this model, the procuring officer chooses to procure










Assume, for each procurement, the procuring officer (G) and the firm (F) intend to sign a contract
7This is a simplification made in the model. It may not completely factor in all elements in actual practice but does
contain the most important parts.
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based on a known design A. In nature, if A is contracted, with probability 1 − ρ, the design
is appropriate, and there will be no need for a modification; with probability ρ, there will be a
modification. The cost of performing the design is c for the firm (cost is public information).
Performance of the service with the appropriate design generates utility v for the procuring officer,
while the inappropriate one gives v − ∆, where 0 < ∆ < v. In the case that the design is
inappropriate, a modification is mandatory and costs extra a ∈ [0,∆).8 Denote the procuring
officer’s bargaining power as β (firm’s bargaining power is then [1− β]). The bargaining power is
the same ex-ante and ex-post, if not specified otherwise. Moreover, denote E[πsG] and E[π
c
G] as the
procuring officer’s expected payoff over the sole source process and negotiated proposal process,
respectively. E[πsF ] and E[π
c
F ] are the firm’s expected payoff on receiving a contract via the sole
source process and negotiated proposal process, respectively.
First, I need to set up the overall procurement goal for the agency. Consider an agency receives
annual budget of B from the Congress, in which the agency cannot spend more than that amount.
At the same time, the agency has a list of goods and services it needs to procure throughout the
fiscal year (which the agency planned in the previous fiscal year to help the Congress to decide its
budget for this fiscal year). The agency’s main goal is to acquire all the goods and services needed,
which meet the quality standard, with the lowest prices possible to meet the budget constraint.
Procuring officers in an agency have different tools to achieve its goal, and the most important
among them is which process they use to procure those goods and services. They switch in between
processes to lower the price but expect to acquire the same quality-level goods and services.
However, there is inner conflict for the agency regarding the budget. The agency will control its
spending throughout most of the year and tries to minimize the price at each procurement contract
level. Nevertheless, it may rush to use up all its budget towards the end of the fiscal year since any
unused fund will be returned to the Department of Treasury. This feature is not considered in this
8a can also be interpreted as a transaction cost or a risk of negotiation breakdown in drafting a new contract.
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setup but it may be incorporated in the future.
1.4.2 Cost of Modification
For either the sole source process or the negotiated proposal process, a renegotiation for modification
happens between the procuring officer and the contract-receiving firm. After performing the
service based on the initial contract, if the procuring officer finds the design is inappropriate, there
will be a utility loss, ∆. The procuring officer then needs to pay a modification cost a to recover
∆ fully. Moreover, due to the Nash Bargaining scheme, any surplus gained needs to be divided
between the procuring officer and the firm. Thus, there is a transfer the procuring officer has to
give to the firm in addition to the modification cost s/he pays.
Denote the transfer as h. Then, it is determined by:
max
h
(∆− h− a)β(h)(1−β), (1.1)
in which β is the bargaining power of the procuring officer, and (1 − β) is thus the bargaining
power of the firm.
Take logarithm on both sides of Eq.(1.1) for easier math derivations,
max
h
β log(∆− h− a) + (1− β) log(h).
Differentiate w.r.t. h, which means the amount of transfer, to solve for
h = (1− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
firm’s bargaining power
· (∆− a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
recovered gain
,
which means that the amount of transfer is proportional to the recovered gain, and the proportion
is determined by the firm’s bargaining power. Therefore, for the firm, since the procuring officer
pays the modification cost a, its net gain is the transfer h.
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1.4.3 Sole Source Procuring Process
Here, I specifically focus on the non-competitive sole source procuring process (the procuring
officer only negotiates with one firm). In the sole source procuring process, the procuring officer
reaches out to a firm that s/he believes is capable of performing the service to negotiate the price,
the design, and other details. If there is any modification needed afterward, the procuring officer
will go back to the same firm to negotiate for any change at a cost paid by the officer.





(1− ρ) · [v − ps] + ρ · [v − a− h− ps]
}β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff for the procuring officer
·
{
(1− ρ) · [ps − c] + ρ · [ps − c+ h]
}1−β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff of the firm
.
Recall from the previous section that h = (1−β)(∆−a). In order to solve for the Nash Bargaining







[1− ρ] · [v − ps] + ρ · [v − a− (1− β)(∆− a)− ps
)
+ (1− β) log
(
[1− ρ] · [ps − c] + ρ · [ps − c+ (1− β)(∆− a)]
)}
.
After solving Eq.(1.2), in the sole source process, the price the procuring officer will offer to the
firm.9
ps = c+ (1− β) ·
[
v − c− ρ∆
]
, (1.3)
in which (1−β) is the firm’s bargaining power and [v− c−ρ∆] is the procuring officer’s expected
total surplus when the initial contract is signed.
Then, using ps derived above, for the procuring officer, the expected payoff of the sole source
procuring process is the sum of expected payoff when there will be no modification and the
9See Appendix B for details.
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expected payoff when there will be a modification
E[πsG] =
(
1− ρ)(v − ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no modification
+ ρ(v − a− h− ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
modification
= β(v − c− ρa).
(1.4)
When there is no modification, the procuring officer’s payoff is the surplus of exogenous valuation
of the procurement, v, over the price needed to pay to the firm, ps; when there is a modification,
procuring officer’s payoff decreased by the modification cost (a) plus the recovered net surplus
(∆ − a) that has to be shared with the firm. After simplification, the expected payoff can also be
interpreted as the share of surplus the procuring officer will receive conditioning on the level of
uncertainty.
Meanwhile, the expected payoff for the firm is
E[πsF ] = (p
s − c) + ρh
= (1− β)(v − c− ρa).
(1.5)
Similarly to the procuring officer’s expected payoff in Eq.(1.5), the expected payoff of the firm is
the share of surplus the firm will receive conditioning on the level of uncertainty.
1.4.4 Negotiated Proposal Procuring Process
If the procuring officer chooses to procure the good or service via the negotiated proposal
process, he/she, in general, expects some level of competitiveness in the negotiation stage. However,
the procuring officer also realize that it is possible that only one firm will submit an offer to
participate. The competitiveness depends on the scope of the service needed and whether there
is a market for it. Therefore, he procuring officer has an endowed belief α ∈ [0, 1] that only one
firm will participate in the competition, and (1 − α) there will be at least two firms participating.
This belief is based on the procuring officer’s understanding of the corresponding market. The
mechanism of bilateral Nash Bargaining is still used when there is renegotiation for modification.
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And β and (1−β) are denoted as the bargaining power of the procuring officer and the firm during
the renegotiation, respectively.
If at least two firms are participating, following Tirole (2009), assume there is Bertrand competition,
in which each firm offers a price equals to the cost, c, subtracting the share of expected net
recovered surplus ([1− β] · [∆− a]) the firm will receive, which is
pc = c− ρ · (1− β)(∆− a). (1.6)
A simple logic proves why Eq.(1.6) is the equilibrium price. If one of the firms offers a price ε
higher than pc, the other firm can cut down to offer pc. And if one firm offers a price ε lower than
pc, the firm suffers a loss.
If only one firm participates, the negotiation indeed turns into a bilateral Nash Bargaining, thus
the equilibrium price is equivalent to the price in sole source process:
ps = c+ (1− β)
[
v − c− ρ∆
]
(1.7)
ps and pc are the equilibrium prices conditional on the procuring process and the level of competitiveness.
From the firm’s point of view, it can always start by submitting an offer with a price ps. For the sole
source process, ps is the final contract price. For the negotiated process, if there is more than one
participant, the contract price will be ”bid down” to pc (the number of offers submitted is publicly
known); if there is only one firm shows up, the price will stay at ps.10
Additionally, I can also see the properties of the two price equations (Eq.1.6 and Eq.1.7) regarding
10For the negotiated proposal process, the procuring officer will set up a deadline for submitting proposals.














Conditioning on the uncertainty (ρ) and the level of competitiveness (α), the procuring officer’s
expected payoff in a negotiated proposal process is:
E[πcG] = (1− ρ) ·
[









= (1− α)(v − c− ρa)− k,
(1.8)
where k is the cost of organizing a competition. For the procuring officer, in each scenario (without
modification or with modification), with probability α, the competition turns into a bilateral bargaining,
so the procuring officer expects the price to be ps; with probability 1 − α, there is Bertrand
competition, so the procuring officer expects the price to be pc. The procuring officer’s payoff
is the difference between his/her valuation on the procurement and the cost(s). When there is no
modification, the only cost is the price paid to the firm. When there is a modification, the procuring
officer needs to pay the modification cost and the transfer in addition to the price.
At the meantime, when there is only one firm participating, the firm’s expected payoff is the same
as it in Eq.(1.5)
E[πsF ] = (1− β)(v − c− ρa).
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And when there are at least two firms participating, the firm will receive zero profit due to the
property of Bertrand Competition
E[πcF ] = p
c − c+ ρ(1− β)(∆− a)
= c− ρ(1− β)(∆− a)− c+ ρ(1− β)(∆− a)
= 0,
in which the firm’s total expected revenues just cover its costs.
Though the renegotiation for modification presents to have the exact hold-up cost for both processes,
how each of them affects the contract price is different. In the sole source process, the procuring
officer must share a portion of the surplus with the firm based on the bargaining power. However,
for the negotiated proposal process, firms will bring down the price to the break-even level. If there
is no uncertainty, the lowest bid a firm can submit is the cost, c. With the expected gain from the
potential modification, firms will be able to offer a price lower than c.
1.4.5 Choosing A Procuring Process
Based on Eq.(1.4) and Eq.(1.8), choosing a negotiated proposal procuring process over a sole
source procuring process is determined by
α(v − ps) + (1− α)(v − pc)− ρ · (a+ h)− k > (v − ps)− ρ · (a+ h),
⇔
(1− α)(ps − pc)− k > 0. (1.9)
In words, the procuring officer is weighting between the extra gain ([1 − α] · [ps − pc]) and extra
cost (k) of using a negotiated proposal process instead of a sole source process.
22
Plugin Eq.(1.3) and Eq.(1.6) into Eq.(1.9) to yield Condition 1:
(1− α)(1− β)ṽ − k︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
> 0, (1.10)
in which ṽ = [v − c − ρ · a] is the total surplus conditional on the uncertainty. v − c is the
surplus of successfully performing the service when there is no uncertainty. With uncertainty ρ,
there is another potential cost of a. Meanwhile, (1 − α) is the probability that competition can
actually happen; (1 − β) is procuring officer’s bargaining power. Thus, (1 − α)(1 − β)ṽ is the
expected surplus when the negotiated proposal process is chosen, conditional that more than one
firm participates. k is the additional cost for organizing a competition. Thus, K is the procuring
officer’s expected gain/loss from choosing a negotiated proposal process.
From the comparative statistics of Condition 1, I can see that the negotiated proposal procuring
process is more likely to be chosen when:




= −[1− α] · [1− β] < 0
)
,




= −[1− β]ṽ < 0
)
,




= −[1− β] · [1− α]a < 0
)
,




= [1− α] · [1− β] > 0
)
,









Data used in this paper are from USAspending.gov, which extracts and summarizes procurement
contracts from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). Information in the dataset can be
divided into these three categories: 1). Characteristics of procurement contracts including initial
contract value, date of signing, length of the contract, place of performance, type of procuring
process, number of offer(s) received, number of modification(s) 2). Identities of contract-receiving
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firms with their characteristics including location (of the firm), contacting information, and preferences
program(s)11 3). Identities of procuring agencies and funding agencies
Each Procurement contract in the dataset is labeled by a Product and Service Code (PSC) and
Claimant Program Code. I choose a sample of Service (S1 in Claimant Program Code) contracts
with PSC Category B (Special Research/Studies, Non-R&D) consisting of procurements procured
via Sole Source (SS) procuring process from 2005-2016 and procurements that are procured via
Negotiated Proposal/Quote (NP) procuring process during the same period. I also restrict my
attention to fixed-price definitive contracts.12. For a fixed-price contract, the procuring officer
offers the firm a fixed amount of money to perform the service.13 Generally speaking, the fixed-
price scheme provides the maximum incentive for the firm to control production costs. A definitive
contract will include the specific amount of service the procurement needs to fulfill.
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of the Sample
Variables
SS NP
Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Initial price $484,927 $301,472 $555,542 392 $399,193 $252,125 $444,151 572
Final price $714,977 $351,475 $1,520,186 392 $536,638 $330,218 $740,180 572
Length (days) 357 364 259 392 368 365 257 572
Num. Offers 1 1 0 392 9 5 18 572
Num. Modification 3 2 3.02 392 3 2 2.18 572
Num. Firms-nationwidea 329 341 102 381 298 317 116 569
Num. Firms-MSAb 1,825 383 3,913 381 1,957 521 3,995 569
a number of firms for an industry (by 6-digit NAICS) nationwide
b number of firms for an industry (by 2-digit NAICS) in MSA
11Such as 8(A) Small Businesses Program and Hubzone Program
12Refered to as “non-indefinitive” in the FAR
13Another popular pricing scheme is a cost-reimbursement pricing scheme, in which a procuring officer makes
payments for approved incurred costs.
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Table 1.5 presents a summary of statistics of the dataset I use. With roughly the same average
and variation in contract length, services procured via the negotiated proposal process have, on
average, lower dollar amounts than contracts procured via the sole source procuring process. I
exclude contracts that are under the threshold of the Simple Acquisition Procuring Process. The
threshold is set to change every five fiscal years based on inflation. From 2005-2009, the threshold
is $100,000. In 2010, the threshold was adjusted to $150,000, and it was further increased to
$250,000 in 2016. Additionally, services procured by the negotiated proposal process induce pretty
much the same number of modifications compared to those by the sole source process. The level of
competitiveness (number of firms in a specific industry) is also similar in the two types of procuring
processes. Statistics in this table build the foundation that procurements in the two processes are
comparable. They are from the same pool of need for services.
Table 1.6: Distribution of Number of Modifications of the Sample
Num. SS NP
Modification N Share N Share
Zero 246 62.76% 385 67.31%
One 78 19.90% 99 17.31%
Two 26 6.63% 41 7.17%
Three 12 3.06% 20 3.50%
≥Four 30 7.65% 27 4.71%
Total 392 572
Table 1.6 shows the distribution of the number of modifications across the two processes. I can
see that, roughly, both procuring processes have a similar distribution pattern, with the sole source
process has more weight leaning towards the left end. In other words, based on the numbers,
the sole source process is associated with fewer modifications. Additionally, the occurrence of
modification is not uncommon, though having more than three modifications is rare.
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of Contract Length in Two Processes
Figure 1.2 above compares the contract length between the two processes.14 I can see similar
distributions of contract lengths. That is a piece of indirect evidence that a pool of procurements
available for using either the negotiated proposal process or the sole source process.
1.5.2 Scenarios in Data
This dataset includes two procuring processes, the sole source process and the negotiated
proposal process. Ideally, through the negotiated proposal process, the procuring officer will
receive more than one offer to induce competition over the contracting price. However, it is
uncommon that only one offered is received, which turns the process into a sole source technically.
Thus, there are three scenarios 1) negotiated proposal procuring process with more than one offer,
2)negotiated proposal procuring process with only one offer, 3) sole source with one offer. I
observe the contract price for each of those scenarios. However, an issue arises here that I do not
observe the two prices (competitive vs. non-competitive) that the procuring officer has in mind
14For comparison, I did not show contract lengths that are longer than 1,200 days, in which there are 12 observations
in total
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when he/she decides the choice of the negotiated proposal process.
1.5.3 Variables and parameters in the data
The most important variable in the dataset is the Initial price, which reflects the dollar amount
the procuring officer has to pay to the firm when the contract is signed. I use it as the dependent
variable when I estimate the impacts of uncertainty and cost on contract prices. Nevertheless, since
the procuring process will also impact the contract price based on theory, I will not include it in
the estimation of choice of the process.
For each procurement contract with a PSC sub-category i received by a firm j at a time t, what I also
observe in the data are: 1) Lengthijt: initial length of the procurement contract. Procurements in the
dataset are mostly surveys/studies. The variable serves as a proxy of the cost of the procurement,
in which the longer the contract length is, the higher c is. 2) N Modijt: the total number of ex-
post modifications for each procurement. 3) Offerijt: the number of proposals received in each
procurement. Length can reflect the cost of performing a service since, in general, a service with a
higher cost will make the procuring officer pay more and allow for a longer time to finish. However,
there is a potential correlation issue between the two proxies, so I only use the Length to proxy for
the cost in later estimations of choice of procuring process and contract prices.
One of the key variables in the model is the level of competitiveness. Although I observe the
number of proposals received for each procurement, it conditions on the process used, which
implies an endogeneity issue. Thus, I incorporate the data from Census Bureau that includes
information on the level of competitiveness using the industry identifier, NAICS, 1) N firm nationit:
with a matching NAICS code (a six-digit industry identifier, which is assigned by the procuring
officer for each contract), the number of firms nationwide. 2) N firm MSAit: with a matching first
two digit of the NAICS code, the number of firms in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
in which the procurement contract is performed. When the need for service arises, the location
of performance is known. The procuring officer will first look for firms in the surrounding area.
And firms in the area will also seek for procurements that are close to their offices. Therefore,
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in addition to numbers at the national level, I also include numbers in the MSA level, reflecting
economic zones.
In order to estimate procuring officer’s expectation on the likelihood of a modification, I create
measures of procuring officer’s ”experience” for each procurement. Denote Exper Agencyijt and
Exper Officeijt as the experience accumulated by an agency and office, respectively. For each
one of the experience variables, it counts the number of contracts prior to procurement ijt, in
the previous four fiscal years, under the same PSC sub-category.15 However, since all offices
belong to certain agencies, including both experience variables will cause a colinearity problem,
I also generate Exper Diffijt to reflect the difference between the two variables. In summary,
Exper Officeijt proxies for an office’s experience and Exper Diffijt proxies for the additional experience
she receives from her supervising agency. Table 1.7 shows the summary statistics of those three
variables.
Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Experience Variables
VARIABLE Mean Median SD N
Experience-Agency 1,822 1,704 1,553 964
Experience-Office 137 69 187 964
Experience-Diff 1,685 1,590 1,476 964
Each agency does possess the ”experience” that the agency does not, but a majority of ”experience”
also comes from the agency. Using Experience-Office and Experience-Diff in estimations is more
appropriate.
15For a procuring office which signed a contract in the fiscal year 2006, her experience for the same sub-category
only goes back to 2002.
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1.6 Empirical Estimation
1.6.1 Steps of Estimation
For empirical estimations, I first show a simple regression on the number of modifications
occurred. Then, I present an estimation approach based on the Extended Roy Model.16, which
includes the following three steps.
First, generate the procuring officer’s expectation on whether a modification will occur. A key
element in the model is the uncertainty of procurement and how the procuring officer takes that into
consideration. I estimate the likelihood of a modification occurred using the cost of the contract and
the number of contracts under the same subcategory of Special Study/Research an agency/office
has awarded previously. The product or service code is used as a control to reflect the fact that
different types of studies/services generate different likelihoods. Additionally, fiscal year is used
for controlling yearly differences due to any policy change.
Second, I use a Probit model to estimate the procuring officer’s choice of a procuring process.
Since I only observe the procuring process used in each procurement, there is an endogenous
selection issue. Thus, I use two sets of variables: a set of variables that determine contract prices
and a set of variables that only affect the choice of process but not contract prices. The control in
this step is fiscal year. Procuring officers’ choices varies year by year due to changes in policies
and guidance.
Third, from the estimation results of the choice of process, I calculate the Mill’s Ratio to capture the
correlation between error terms of the two price equations (negotiated proposal and sole source).
In the final step, I estimate the impact of cost and uncertainty on contract prices of different
scenarios. Fiscal year control and location (state) control are applied in this estimation to reflect
16Comparing to the Standard Roy Model, the Extended Roy Model includes variables that only affects the choice
of process but not prices.
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price differences across year and location of performance.
1.6.2 Descriptive Estimation
First, I start with a simple regression setup,
N modijt =α0 + α1 ·Dijt + α2 · Lengthijt + α3 · N firm nationijt + α4 · N firm MSAijt
+ α5 · Exper Office + α6 · Exper Diff + ξijt,
where





Table 1.8: Correlation of Variables
Number of-
Length Procedure
Num. Firms- Num. Firms- Experience-
Modifications Nationwide MSA Office
Length 0.008
Procedure -0.047 0.020
Num. Firms-Nationwide -0.003 0.057 -0.014
Num. Firms-MSA -0.059 -0.064 0.018 0.025
Experience-Office -0.027 0.100 0.212 0.159 -0.142
Experience-Diff -0.035 0.032 -0.108 0.286 -0.114 0.355
Table 1.8 shows correlations among independent variables. I do not see any strong correlations,
so there is no colinearity problem. It is also quite clear the the Number of Modifications is
negatively correlated with the experience variables. However, the Procedure is positively correlated
with the level of competitiveness at the national level and negatively correlated with it at the MSA
level. From Table 1.9, a longer contract length is associated with more modifications. The sole
source process, in general, tends to have fewer modifications. More competition is correlated with
fewer modifications as well. Coefficients in this table intuitively make sense, but it is lack of
structural framework. It is questionable whether keeping variables with similarities (such as Log
Num. Firms-Nationwide and Log Num. Firms-MSA) are necessary.
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Table 1.9: Descriptive Regression
Num. Modifications
Specification I II III IV
Length (in 100 days) 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.0004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Procedure (NP=1) -0.201* -0.153 -0.156 -0.018
(0.112) (0.113) (0.118) (0.131)
Log Num. Firms-Nationwide 0.006 -0.055 0.924
(0.115) (0.044) (0.139)








Observations 964 948 948 948
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
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Table 1.10: Contract Prices
(Simple Setup)
SPECIFICATION I II III
Length (in 100 Days) 0.123* 0.125** 0.166**
(0.063) (0.309) (0.065)
LL. of Mod. (uncertainty) 0.135 0.133 -0.423
(1.151) (1.152) (1.195)
Negotiated Proposal Dummy -0.868 -0.903*** -0.990***
(0.324) (0.340) (0.368)
Single Offer NP Dummy++ 0.167 -0.123
(0.509) (0.539)
Location Control ×
Observations 964 964 964
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
++ This indicator is 1 when the negotiated proposal process is used and
only one offer is received
Table 1.10 is the results of a simple regression of contract price on several determinants with
a indicator variable specifying the chosen procuring processes. From the estimates, it is clear that
a higher contract length is associated with a higher price. However, the effect of the uncertainty
is inconclusive and insignificant. Additionally, the Negotiated Proposal Dummy indicates that
the contract price is generally lower in the negotiated proposal process. In order to reflect the
special (but not uncommon) scenario that the negotiated proposal is used but only one offer is
received, I add another dummy, Single Offer NP Dummy, in Specification II and III. Although the
results in those two specifications are contradicting to each other, including this dummy improves
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the significance level of the Negotiated Proposal Dummy. Notably, for a procurement contract
procured through the negotiated proposal process but only received one offer, it takes the value 1
in both dummies.
1.6.3 Estimation with An Extended Roy’s Model
In this section, I layout the econometric foundation of the Extended Roy Model.
Recall the equation that determined the choice of negotiated proposal process:
(1− α)(pc − ps) + k < 0.









pc − ps = (1− α)(1− β)[v − c− ρ · a], (1.12)
The procuring officer chooses either the sole source process or the negotiated proposal process. As
an econometrician, I only observe one or the other. Write the procuring officer’s expected price for
the sole source as
ps = X ′θs + ηs + τs︸ ︷︷ ︸
εs
, (1.13)
and expected price for the negotiated proposal as
pc = X ′θc + ηc + τc︸ ︷︷ ︸
εc
. (1.14)
X = {x1, x2, ..., xi} is the vector of characteristics that only affect the price in procurements.
Error terms ηs and ηc are structural errors which the procuring officer knows, but I do not observed
them, as an econometrician. The two procuring processes studies in this paper provide different
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procedures for the procuring officer to follow. And the procuring officer expect to receive information
from, but not limited to, interacting with one or multiple firms, depending on the process. That
information will have different effects on the contract prices. However, the procuring officer
does not observe (neither do I) the unexpected price shock τs, τc. Since the price shock is not
conditioning on the procuring process, I can assume τs ≈ τc. Therefore, I can define
v = εc − εs ≡ ηc − ηs.
In addition, there is a vector Y = {y1, y2, ..., yi} that only affects the procuring officer’s decision
for procuring process but not the contract price. In my model, this is the level of competitiveness
(1− α) in Eq. (1.11).
Combining with estimable price equations Eq.(1.13) and Eq.(1.14), for a particular procurement i,
a procuring officer chooses the negotiated proposal over the sole source when
[x′i(θ
c − θs) + y′iω] + (εci − εsi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vi
< 0.
The choice of process is determined by three components: known price difference (x′i(θ
c − θs),
impact of competitiveness (yiω), and shocks (vi). Thus, the probability that a procurement i is
chosen to be procured through the negotiated proposal process is
P = Pr
(























Φ(·) is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.From the choice equation I can only identify θ∗.
Let θ̂∗ represents the estimated parameter.
Several assumptions are needed
• (εc, εs) ⊥⊥ (X, Y ),
• εc ∼ (0, σ2c ) and εs ∼ (0, σ2s),






 σ2s σsc − σ2s
σsc − σ2s σ2s + σ2c − 2σsc
].








Subsequently, the expected price under the negotiated proposal process conditional on the choice
of negotiated proposal process can be written as (referred to Appendix C for more detail):




















with σcv = cov(εc, v) = E[εc · (εc− εs)] = σ2c − σsc. x′θc represents the part the contract price the
procuring officer knows, and E
(
εci | viσv < ziθ
∗
)
is the part of the unknown shock conditional on

























Following the same steps, for the expected price of the sole source process, the procuring officer
expects a draw of error term of the sole source process and with parameter estimates from the sole
source process as well. Thus,






















However, it is possible that there is only one firm submitting offer in the negotiated proposal
process. His/her expected price of the contract based on the parameter estimates of a sole source
procurement but conditioning on the choice of the negotiated proposal process.
























• Negotiated proposal with more that one offer






• Negotiated proposal with only one offer























gives consistent estimates θc (θs), λc (λs). And then
I can identify γ, σv.






is approximately linear then there is a collinearity problem;
2) if ps and pc are not normally distributed, then the model is misspecified.
1.7 Results and Analysis
In this section, I will elaborate results of my estimations step by step.
1.7.1 Step I: Likelihood of Modification
Table 1.11 and 1.12 show my first step to address the issues I discussed in Section 1.6.2.
Both of them are parameter estimates of a procuring officer’s expectation on modifications. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether modification(s) occurred after signing the
initial procurement contract. As discussed before, there are two categories of modifications in
the data: bilateral and unilateral. Based on the model I built, I only account for the occurrence
of the bilateral modification in the estimation. Therefore, if at least one bilateral modification
occurs, the dependent variable takes the value 1. In Table 1.11, I use the experience variable at the
agency level. In general, the likelihood of modification increases with a longer contract length and
decreases with the experience accumulated at the agency level. When moving from Specification
I to Specification II, estimation results are stable. However, while moving from Specification II
to III, the significant level on contract length drops, and the magnitude of estimate on experience
dramatically increases. In Specification III, one standard deviation (1,553 count) of experience
from the agency level decreases the probability of modification by 8.5%. A problem of using the
experience variable at the agency level is that it may not vary enough across observations. And
some agencies procure a lot more services than other agencies. Also, even within the same agency,
different offices have different practices following the same set of regulations.
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Table 1.11: Occurrence of Modification I
Modification(=1)
SPECIFICATION I II III
Length (in 100 days) 0.012** 0.011* 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Experience-Agency (in 1,000 count) -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.055***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017)
Year Control × ×
Type Control ×
Observations 964 964 964
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
Therefore, in Table 1.12, I replace Experience-Agency variable with Experience-Office. Additionally,
Experience-Diff variable captures the difference between the experience of a procuring office and
the experience of the agency to which the office belongs. This variable is to capture the experience
that is at the agency level but not the office level.
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Table 1.12: Occurrence of Modification II
Modification(=1)
SPECIFICATION I II III
Length (in 100 days) 0.012** 0.012** 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Experience-Office (in 1,000 count) -0.187** -0.098 -0.171*
(0.086) (0.091) (0.094)




Observations 964 964 964
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
From all three specifications above, the longer the contract length, the more likely it is that a
modification will happen. Both experience variables show that, with a higher level of experience,
the lower probability that a modification will happen. This suggests that agencies and offices
are learning from their previous activities. For Specification III, with the fiscal year control and
the type control (product or service code), results suggest that an additional 100-day contract
length increases the probability of modification by 1.0%. One standard deviation (187 counts)
increase of the experience of the contracting office decreases the likelihood of modification by
3.2%. Moreover, one standard deviation (1,476 count) increase in the experience of the difference
(between office and agency) decreases the probability of a modification by 7.2%. This table’s
results are relatively stable, so I will use estimates in Specification III of Table 1.12 to generate the
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predicted likelihood of modification for each procurement.
Table 1.13: Occurrence of Modifications-Ordered Estimation
PREDICTED Pr(Mod=0) Pr(Mod=1) Pr(Mod=2) Pr(Mod=3) Pr(mod=4)
SPECIFICATION I II I II I II I II I II
Length (in 100 Days) -0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience-Agency 0.062*** -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.20***
(in 1,000 count) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Experience-Office 0.171* -0.058* -0.037* -0.022* -0.054*
(in 1,000 count) (0.091) (0.031) (0.020) (0.012) (0.029)
Experience-Diff 0.055*** -0.019*** -0.012*** 0.007*** 0.018***




Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
Instead of using a binary indicator, Table 1.13 uses the number of modifications as the dependent
variable [four or more modifications are grouped together as Pr(mod = 4)]. Comparing across
different predicted probabilities, estimates on Length do not vary too much except the one of
Pr(Mod = 0). For Experience-Office and Experience-Diff, results are inconclusive, especially in
the case of Pr(Mod = 0).
1.7.2 Step II: Choice of Procuring Process
Table 1.14 includes marginal effects on the procuring officer’s choice of the procuring process,
estimated by a Probit regression adapted in the Extended Roy Model setting. Specification I only
consists of the contract length, the likelihood of modification, and the level of competitiveness.
Specification II includes the linear trend of fiscal year (Year trend). Both estimations show that,
with an increase in contract length, it is more likely that the procuring officer tends to use the
negotiated process more often. However, the theory predicts that the sole source should be used
40
when the contract length is more prolonged (higher cost). With a higher cost, the benefit of using
the negotiated proposal is outweighed by the cost of organizing a competitive process.
Additionally, a higher likelihood of modification makes the procuring officer lean towards using
the sole source process. The sign of this estimate is what the model predicts, which suggests that
with a higher uncertainty, the procuring officer is more likely to turn to a process which he/she has
more control. As for the level of competitiveness, with more firms in the same industry in an MSA
area, the procuring officer is more likely to choose the negotiated proposal process. This fits to the
model’s prediction. With more firms in a market, the procuring will have more chance to organize
a competition.
Figure 1.3: Histograms of Contract Length (in Days) by Quartile
(a) Pct.25% (b) Pct.50%
(c) Pct.75% (d) Pct.100%
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Table 1.14: Choice of Procuring Process
Procedure (Negotiated Proposal=1)
SPECIFICATION I II III
Length (in 100 days) 0.008 0.010* -
(0.006) (0.006) -
LL. of Mod. (uncertainty) -0.219* -0.282** -0.305***
(0.113) (0.112) (0.111)
Log Num. Firms-MSA 0.042*** 0.025** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)








Observations 950 950 950
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
From Figure 1.3, it is clear that there is a spike of observations around the one-year mark. This
could result from a relevant policy that any procurement contract expects to go beyond a year needs
additional legislative approvals. Therefore, I re-group the contract length into the following four
batches.
1. Batch 1: fewer than or equal to 210 days
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2. Batch 2: more than 210 days and fewer than or equal to 363 days
3. Batch 3: more than 363 days and fewer than or equal to 370 days
4. Batch 4: more than 370 days
Specification II and III in Table 1.14 use the batches to replace the contract length variable. The
marginal effects of the likelihood of modification and the number of firms in MSA change slightly.
For estimates of batches, in Specification II, compared to the Batch 4, the other three batches, with
shorter contract lengths, make the procuring officer more likely to use the sole source process,
which matches the prediction. Subsequently, I use estimates in Step II to calculate the Mill’s ratio
for Step III.
1.7.3 Step III: Contract Prices
In Table 1.15 and 1.16, I divide the data into three scenarios: sole source process, negotiated
proposal process with only one offer, and negotiated proposal process with more than one offer
(fully competitive). In each of those tables, I compare estimates results without and with the
selection bias being corrected. In Table 1.15, the results of the negotiated proposal with more
than one offer are not significant and conclusive. Besides, with the bias being corrected, a longer
contract length induces a higher contract price; and a higher uncertainty makes the contract price
drop. Comparing corrected results to uncorrected ones, I can see there is a downward bias for the
contract length and upward bias for the uncertainty. One of the purposes to split the data into three
scenarios is that the theory predict them to behave differently. And I do observe that estimates in
each scenarios are not close to the others. Especially, estimates of the negotiated proposal with
one offer is not identical to the estimate of the negotiated proposal with more than one offer, which
matches the prediction. The theoretical model also predict that the negotiated proposal with only
one offer is close to the sole source. This will be discussed later.
Subsequently, in Table 1.16, I replaced the contract length variable with batches to see if I can
get better results. Estimates roughly follow the same pattern as the ones in Table 1.15. Results
also show that, based upon Batch 4, procurements in the other three batches have lower prices
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when the sole source process is used. However, for the negotiated proposal process, procurements
in Batch 1-3 have higher contract prices. Comparing the corrected results with the uncorrected
ones, it demonstrates that the impact of the contract length and the uncertainty are underestimated
without the bias being corrected.
In summary, results in Table 1.15 and 1.16 for the most part confirm predictions of the theoretical
model.
Figure 1.4: Histogram of Mill’s Ratio
(a) Sole Source (b) Negotiated Proposal
And such selection bias affects the price in sole source differently it in the negotiated proposal.
From Figure 1.4, values of MR used in the estimation are positive, but I can see that the coefficient
on MR is negative for the sole source and the negotiated proposal with one offer, and positive for
the negotiated proposal with more than one offer. In other words, when the sign on MR is negative,
the procuring officer’s expected price is higher than what I observe, and vice versa.
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Table 1.15: Contract Prices
SCENARIO SS NP (=1) NP (>1)
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
Length (in 100 Days) 0.312*** 0.398*** 0.433 0.949** 0.108 0.079
(0.117) (0.142) (0.316) (0.401) (0.083) (0.104)
LL. of Mod. (uncertainty) -4.839** -7.059** -0.417 -6.831 1.193 2.000
(2.533) (3.274) (7.263) (7.794) (2.086) (2.750)
MR -4.192 15.134** -1.575
(3.918) (7.447) (3.492)
Year Control × × × × × ×
Location Control × × × × × ×
Observations 381 381 117 117 451 451
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
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Table 1.16: Contract Prices-Alternative
SCENARIO SS NP (=1) NP (>1)
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
LL. of Mod. (uncertainty) -3.856 -8.226* 1.948 2.678 1.092 5.290
(2.520) (4.669) (7.051) (11.604) (2.056) (4.659)
Batch 1 -1.237 -2.991 -1.082 -0.826 -1.052 0.513
(0.891) (1.812) (1.287) (3.474) (0.649) (0.655)
Batch 2 -0.757 -2.453 3.153** 3.384 -0.436 1.383*
(0.881) (1.747) (1.207) (3.152) (0.607) (0.776)
Batch 3 -0.184 -1.454 0.188 0.367 0.720 -0.418
(0.848) (1.422) (1.007) (2.467) (0.597) (1.600)
MR - -8.297 - -1.454 - -7.911
- (7.463) - (18.274) - (7.877)
Year Control × × × × × ×
Location Control × × × × × ×
Observations 381 381 117 117 451 451
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
Nevertheless, based on the model’s predictions, I should see that estimates of sole source and
negotiated proposal with only one offer should be very similar to those in the sole source process.
Though I may state estimates in negotiated proposal with one offer are closer to estimates in the
sole source than in the negotiated proposal with more than one offer, I cannot say they are the same
statistically.
In Table 1.17, null hypotheses are the estimates in two regressions are the same.
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Table 1.17: Estimates Comparison
Sepcification I Specification II











0.00 0.974 0.06 0.813{
θssB 1 − θ
np1
B 1 = 0
}
0.12 0.728{
θssB 2 − θ
np1
B 2 = 0
}
0.55 0.458{
θssB 3 − θ
np1
B 3 = 0
}
0.29 0.592
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ comparing between sole source and negotiated proposal with
one offer
++ θnp1L denotes to the estimate of contract length for negotiated
proposal with one offer
Since all test statistics are insignificant, all those hypotheses can be rejected statistically. Though
estimates on the negotiated proposal with one offer fit the model’s predictions overall, they are not
comparable to the estimates of the sole source. There are fewer more one hundred observations for
the negotiated proposal with one offer, so I may need more observations in this scenario to draw a
final conclusion.
Next, in Table 1.18, I consolidate observations of the sole source process and the negotiated
proposal with only one offer. In all three specifications, I still see that with a longer contract
length, the contract price is higher. However, the marginal effect is smaller than the ones in Table
1.15. Estimates of the uncertain is this regression is negative but insignificant, which does not
provide strong enough evidence to support the conclusion that a higher uncertainty decreases the
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contract price.
Table 1.18: Consolidated Regression
(Sole Source and Negotiated Proposal with One Offer)
SPECIFICATION I II III
Length (in 100 days) 0.203** 0.179* 0.242**
(0.103) (0.101) (0.109)
LL. of Mod. (uncertainty) -1.648 -3.391 -3.080
(1.671) (2.075) (2.213)
MR -2.253 0.060 0.776
(1.000) (1.037) (1.204)
Year Control × ×
Type Control ×
Observations 499 499 499
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+ All estimates are marginal effects
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I study how the uncertainty for future changes affects the agreement between
two parties and the choice of the path they choose to form such an agreement. Using a dataset
of service procurement contracts awarded by the DOD from 2005-2016, I build a model that the
uncertainty towards the possible modification(s) would affect the procuring officer’s choice of
procuring process. A crucial issue I face with data is that I do not observe the procuring officer’s
decision-making process but just the outcome of his/her choice of procuring process. In order to
address this issue, I adapt an Extended Roy Model to recover parameters in the procuring officer’s
choice of process and use it to correct the biases in estimations of the contract price. Results
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show a higher uncertainty also makes the procuring officer leaning towards using the sole source
price more often. With a longer contract length, the overall trend shows that makes the procuring
officer more likely to use the negotiated proposal. However, breaking into batches, comparing to
contracts with the longest lengths, the procuring officer tends to use the sole source process in
shorter lengths. As for contract prices, the evidence supports that a higher cost induces a higher
price, but only weakly support the prediction that a higher uncertainty causes a lower contract price.
My estimations show that the uncertainty can, to some extent, explain the procuring officer’s
tendency to use a non-competitive process. While the contract price in the non-competitive process
is higher, the procuring officer can also bargain with higher uncertainty. Those are supported
by the model developed in the paper. Policy-wise, one implication from this paper is that the
use of a less competitive process can be justified by some practical concerns. And legislators





In the scenario that a renegotiation for modification between the procuring officer and the
contract-receiving firm happens, the procuring officer loses utility, ∆, and needs to pay modification
cost a to fully recover ∆. However, the procuring officer has to share a part of his/her recovered
net gain to the firm as a result of the Nash bargaining. Denoted the transfer of net gain as h:
max
h
(∆− h− a)β(h)(1−β), (A.1)
in which the β is the bargaining power of the procuring officer and (1 − β) is thus the bargaining













h = (1− β)(∆− a).
Subsequently, conditioning on the transfer h in renegotiation, I derive the price of contract in the
sole source negotiation, ps: First, for the procuring officer, with probability 1 − ρ, the design is
appropriate, so the procuring officer receives utility v and pays a price ps; with probability ρ, the
design is inappropriate, the procuring officer needs to pay a to modify it and transfer h to the firm.
Second, for the firm, with probability 1 − ρ, it receives price ps and spends cost c to perform the
service; with probability ρ, the firm receives the additional transfer h from the procuring officer.




(1− ρ) · (v − ps) + ρ · (v − a− h− ps)
}β{





















(v − ps)− ρ · (a+ h)
]
+ (1− β) log
[





(v − ps)− ρ · (a+ h)
+
(1− β)









[c+ v − c− ps]− ρh
}
Rearrange the terms and plug in h = (1− β)(∆− a):
(ps)∗ = c+ (1− β)(v − c)− (1− β) · ρa− (1− β) · ρ(∆− a). (A.2)
Expand the terms
(ps)∗ = c+ (1− β)(v − c)−
[








(1− β) · ρa
]
⇒
(ps)∗ = c+ (1− β)
[
(v − c)− ρ∆
]
. (A.3)
Rewrite Eq.(A.3), I have
(ps)∗ = c︸︷︷︸
cost of performing contract
+ (1− β)
[
v − c− ρa
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected surplus shared with the firm
− ρh︸︷︷︸
expected net transfer in renegotiation
.
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And comparing to the price in negotiated proposal:
(pc)∗ = c︸︷︷︸
cost of performing contract
− ρh︸︷︷︸
expected net transfer in renegotiation
. (A.4)
Since the contract price in negotiated proposal is determined by Bertrand competition, the procuring
officer does not share the expected surplus (v − c− ρa) with the firm.
Also, expand Eq.(A.4) and compare to Eq.(A.3)
(ps)∗ = c+ (1− β)
[




(pc)∗ = c− (1− β) · ρ(∆− a).
The Nash bargaining makes every surplus earned by the procuring officer to be divided in between
the procuring officer and the firm based on their bargaining power respectively. Thus, for the sole
source process, in addition to the cost of performing the initial contract, the procuring officer also
earns surplus (v − c) and expects to lose ∆ if there is a modification (ρ). And for the negotiated
proposal, since the Nash bargaining only happens during the renegotiation stage, the procuring
officer only needs to share the net recovered gain (∆− a) if a modification happens.
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APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION STRUCTURE IN EXTENDED ROY MODEL
In the following contents, I present an alternative structure that under the same framework
of the Extended Roy Model. The main difference is that, here, there is exclusion restriction on
characteristics that determine the price of the sole source process and negotiated proposal process.
Similarly to the setting in the main context, but instead I assume there is an exclusion restriction on
characteristics that determine prices in the negotiated proposal process and the sole source process.
Therefore, the procuring officer’s
• expected price for the sole source is





s + ηs + τs︸ ︷︷ ︸
εs
, (B.1)
• expected price for the negotiated proposal is





c + ηc + τc︸ ︷︷ ︸
εc
, (B.2)
• the procuring officer knows ηs, ηc, but as an econometrician, I do not observe them. No
party observes εs, εc. In this setting, I can assume τc ≈ τs,
• I only observes either pc or ps for any procurement.
In addition, there is a vector Y that affect the procuring officer decision for procuring process but
not the price. Also, I define
v = εc − εs ≡ ηc − ηs.
Several assumptions need to be held
• (εc, εs) ⊥⊥ (X, Y ),
• v ⊥⊥ (X, Y ),
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• εc ∼ (0, σ2s) and εc ∼ (0, σ2s),






 σ2s σsc − σ2s
σsc − σ2s σ2s + σ2c − 2σsc
].








Combining with Eq.(B.1) and Eq.(B.2), for a particular procurement i, a procuring officer chooses










0 − θs0) + x′ciθc − x′siθs + y′iγ] + (εci − εsi) < 0.


































Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal. From the choice equation I can only identify θ∗. Let θ̂∗
represents the estimated θ∗.
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Subsequently, the expected price under the negotiated proposal process conditioning on the
choice of negotiated proposal process can be written as:























Following the same steps as those in Scenario I, the price equation can be written as























































εc = λεv + ξ,















Eq.(B.5) can be rewritten as











gives consistent estimates θc0, θ
c, and λ. With consistent
estimators θc0, and θ
c, by using Eq.(B.3), I can identify σv as long as there is an exclusion restriction




DERIVATION OF EMPIRICAL MODEL



















































Denote l = v
σv






































Then write the price equation as
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